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ARTICLE
The 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution: Assessing its
Effectiveness as a Multilateral Environmental
Regime after 35 Years
Adam Byrne*
Abstract
There is no deﬁnitive approach to assessing the effectiveness of international environmental
regimes. In order to explore the regime established by the 1979 Geneva Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution this article broadly integrates the approach to
effectiveness taken by Peter H. Sand in The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Agreements, and Daniel Bodansky in The Art and Craft of International Environmental
Law. The article ﬁnds that compliance, institutional, and normative effectiveness can be
evaluated relatively conﬁdently. An effectiveness assessment of the long-range transbound-
ary air pollution (LRTAP) regime indicates that, on the whole, it has helped states to reach
agreement on contentious issues and achieve results in air pollution reduction. However, it
faces signiﬁcant challenges with regard to participation, implementation procedures,
empowerment of domestic stakeholders, and funding. The article provides an in-depth
and up-to-date look at the LRTAP regime, including the most recent amendments and its
relationship with European Union and international law.
Keywords: Long-range transboundary air pollution, Effectiveness, Compliance,
Implementation, Participation, European Union
1. introduction
November 2014 marked the 35th anniversary of the adoption of the 1979 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP),1 negotiated under the auspices
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). This major regional
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1 Geneva (Switzerland), 13 Nov. 1979, in force 16 Mar. 1983, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/
lrtap/lrtap_h1.html.
multilateral environmental agreement (MEA), with its eight Protocols, has evolved
into a notable environmental regime.2 The long-range transboundary air pollution
(LRTAP) regime attempts to address a number of environmental and health problems
caused by industrialization, agricultural modernization, and fossil fuel consumption.3
This includes the effects of acidiﬁcation, photochemical smog, ground-level ozone,
eutrophication, ﬁne particulate matter (PM2.5, particularly black carbon, a short-
lived climate forcer), and contamination by toxic chemicals.
Scholarly opinions on the effectiveness of the LRTAP regime have varied.4 This article
has three major objectives: to give an overview of the regime, to assess its effectiveness
from the standpoint of current thinking in international environmental law, and to think
critically about how the effectiveness of regimes is assessed. The current effectiveness
discourse is based on interconnected yet separate groupings: legal, normative, problem-
solving, institutional, political, and economic effectiveness.5 Given this fragmentation, it
has been argued that the positivist approach to effectiveness is the most suitable, with
normative considerations less relevant, and approaches based on quantitative methods
suffering from reductionism.6 Two decades ago, Sand’s criteria for effectiveness focused
2 Regime is understood as the ‘norms, rules, and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area’,
as per E.B. Haas, ‘Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes Source’ (1980) 32(3)
World Politics, pp. 357–405, at 358.
3 The CLRTAP deﬁnes air pollution as ‘the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the air resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm
living resources and ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other
legitimate uses of the environment’. LRTAP is ‘air pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or in
part within the area under the national jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects in the area
under the jurisdiction of another State at such a distance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the
contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources’: Art. 1(a) and (b) CLRTAP.
4 M.A. Levy, ‘International Co-operation to Combat Acid Rain’, in H.O. Bergesen & G. Parmann (eds),
Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 1995 (Oxford
University Press, 1995), pp. 59–68, at 64; D. Munton et al., ‘Acid Rain in Europe and North America’,
in O.R. Young (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections
and Behavioral Mechanisms (The MIT Press, 1999), pp. 155–248, at 235; J. Wettestad, Designing
Effective Environmental Regimes: The Key Conditions (Edward Elgar, 1999), at p. 95; J. Wettestad,
‘The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP)’, in E.M. Miles et al. (eds),
Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence (The MIT Press, 2002),
pp. 197–222, at 197; P.W. Birnie, A. Boyle & C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment
(Oxford University Press, 2009), at p. 344; P.N. Okowa, ‘The Legal Framework for the Protection of
the Environment Against Transboundary Air Pollution: A Reﬂection on Customary and Treaty Law’, in
H. Post (ed.), The Protection of Ambient Air in International and European Law (Eleven International,
2009), pp. 53–71, at 71; J. Wettestad, ‘The Improving Effectiveness of CLRTAP: Due to Clever
Design?’, in R. Lidskog & G. Sundqvist (eds), Governing the Air: The Dynamics of Science, Policy, and
Citizen Interaction (The MIT Press, 2011), pp. 39–60, at 49; P. Sands & J. Peel, Principles of Inter-
national Environmental Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at pp. 246–7.
5 O.R. Young & M.A. Levy, ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes’, in Young (ed.),
ibid., pp. 1–32; see also M.A. Mehling, ‘Betwixt Scylla and Charybdis: The Concept of Effectiveness in
International Environmental Law’ (2002) 13 Finnish Yearbook of International Law, pp. 129–82;
C. McGrath,Does Environmental Law Really Work? How to Evaluate the Effectiveness of an Environ-
mental Legal System (Lambert Academic, 2010).
6 See W.B. Chambers, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of Legal Effectiveness of International Envir-
onmental Treaties’ (2003–04) 16 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, pp. 501–32, at
518. For empirical and quantitative approaches see Miles et al. (eds), n. 4 above; and H. Breitmeier,
A. Underdal & O. Young, ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Comparing and
Contrasting Findings from Quantitative Research’ (2011) 13 International Studies Review, pp. 579–605.
For an exploration of the counterfactual scenario using the LRTAP regime as a case study, see C. Helm &
D. Sprinz, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes’ (2000) 14(5) Journal of
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on the treaty objectives and their achievement, the rules and processes concerning state
participation, implementation, information sharing, the provisions for operation, review
and adjustment, and codiﬁcation programming (including both formal and informal
instruments).7 The conceptual approach has subsequently been broadened. Bodansky
has identiﬁed four major determining factors of effectiveness: (i) the nature of the
problem; (ii) the international political system; (iii) the characteristics of the countries
involved; and (iv) the design of the regime. As Bodansky notes, there is a belief that
regime design (the ‘institutional and legal characteristics’ of a regime) plays an important
role in determining effectiveness.8 Bodansky cautions, however, that in light of ‘the
extent that states trade off different design elements against one another, we cannot
analyze these elements in isolation; we need to consider them as a whole’.9 The current
inability to resolve how the trade-offs should be made, with each problem having its own
particular dynamics and the end product reﬂecting a necessary compromise, is suggestive
to Bodansky of international environmental law being ‘an art and a craft’, rather than a
panacea.10 The respective approaches of Sand and Bodansky overlap considerably. This
article merges the two to analyze the effectiveness of the LRTAP regime and test the
robustness of Sand’s and Bodansky’s criteria, focusing on three main areas.11
Legal effectiveness
Legal effectiveness relates to compliance and to what is being complied with. High levels
of compliance are indicative of behavioural change and, by association, effectiveness.12
This approach can engage with ideas such as ambitiousness, treaty content, the
environmental outcomes, and even the ‘spirit’ of the instrument.13 Legally precise rules
reduce ambiguity and highlight cases of non-compliance more easily, while the types of
commitment (or regulatory framework) will exert a strong inﬂuence over whether the
problem is resolved. Related to the issue of content, the legality of the instruments also
Conﬂict Resolution, pp. 630–52, at 644. This approach has been widely critiqued: see McGrath, n. 5
above, at pp. 45–54; G. Shaffer & T. Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship’
(2012) 106(1) American Journal of International Law, pp. 1–46, at 11.
7 P.H. Sand (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing
Legal Instruments (Grotius, 1992), at pp. 4–7. This was part of the preparatory work for the United
Nations 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), undertaken by the
UNCED Secretariat at the request of Working Group III of the Preparatory Committee, and followed
the evaluation criteria set out in Decision 3/25 (A/46/48, vol. II, Annex I and II), available at:
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol = A/46/48%28Vol.II%29%28SUPP%29.
8 D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press,
2011), at pp. 262–4.
9 Ibid., at p. 271. Here, Bodansky draws on S. Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of
Environmental Treaty-Making (Oxford University Press, 2003); and K. Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance
in International Agreements’ (2005) 99(3) American Journal of International Law, pp. 581–614.
10 Bodansky, n. 8 above, at p. 271. See also O.R. Young, ‘Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes: Existing Knowledge, Cutting-edge Themes, and Research Strategies’ (2011) 108(50) Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, pp. 19853–60, at 19857–8.
11 Bodansky, n. 8 above, at pp. 264–5; and Sand, n. 7 above. This article uses the organizing labels of
legal, institutional, and normative effectiveness in Young & Levy, n. 5 above.
12 See Chambers, n. 6 above, at p. 504.
13 E.B. Weiss, ‘Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker’s
Dozen Myths’ (1998–99) 32 University of Richmond Law Review, pp. 1555–89, at 1563. See also
Chambers, n. 6 above.
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contributes to effectiveness. Binding instruments are generally considered the most
effective. However, soft law instruments have political and legal signiﬁcance, allowing
states to participate in times of uncertainty (lack of political agreement, for example),
thereby increasing the potential for behavioural change.14
Institutional effectiveness
Institutional effectiveness focuses on the ability of the regime to create a cooperative
approach, which promotes and assists states in reaching compliance.15 Lack of
cooperation, and inadequate means to increase compliance through rules, procedures,
and institutions for reporting, monitoring and review, dispute settlement, and non-
compliance, will ultimately undermine effectiveness.16
Normative effectiveness
The normative approach is an assessment of the regime’s achievement in, or reﬂection
of, normative principles such as justice, fairness and participation.17 Procedural
justice is viewed as the basis for legitimacy, which should produce greater
compliance.18 Such an analysis can consider the legitimacy and fairness of the rules
concerning participation and decision making, the participation of all the relevant
states, the assignment of implementation responsibilities, the degree of burden
sharing, and ﬁnancial assistance.19 Included in this is the extent to which the regime
empowers domestic supporters through, for example, a role in decision making or the
policy process. This is a way of increasing legitimacy, improving the quality of
decisions, and achieving a greater degree of consensus.20
2. examining the legal effectiveness of
the lrtap regime
2.1. The Commitments and Compliance
During the negotiations for the CLRTAP, polluting states staunchly opposed the
sulphur dioxide (SO2) reduction targets that were needed to control acid rain.
21
14 Bodansky, n. 8 above, at pp. 156 and 264; see J. Friedrich, International Environmental “Soft Law”:
The Functions and Limits of Nonbinding Instruments in International Environmental Governance and
Law (Springer, 2013).
15 Bodansky, ibid., at p. 265. See W.J. Aceves, ‘Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholar-
ship’ (1997) 12 American University International Law Review, pp. 227–66, at 240–56.
16 Bodansky, ibid. See G. Ulfstein (ed.), Making Treaties Work: Human Rights, Environment and Arms
Control (Cambridge University Press, 2007); and A.E. Boyle, ‘Saving the World? Implementation and
Enforcement of International Environmental Law through International Institutions’ (1991) 3 Journal
of Environmental Law, pp. 229–46.
17 Young & Levy, n. 5 above, at p. 5.
18 T.R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, 2006), at p. 272; Chambers, n. 6
above, at p. 512.
19 Bodansky, n. 8 above, pp. 264–5.
20 Ibid., at p. 128.
21 E.g., the United Kingdom (UK) and West Germany; J. McCormick, Acid Earth: The Global Threat of
Acid Pollution (Earthscan, 1990), at p. 76.
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The compromise reached to ensure their participation resulted in a ‘loose’ framework
convention22 that, as Rosencranz noted, contained ‘no numerical goals, limits,
timetables, abatement measures or enforcement provisions’.23 Instead, the
Convention laid out the procedural framework, with signiﬁcant provisions on
‘notiﬁcation and consultation, research, use of control technology, monitoring of
pollutants and rainfall’.24 In Article 2, the contracting parties agreed in vague and
ﬂexible language that ‘taking due account of the facts and problems involved’, they
were ‘determined to protect man and his environment against air pollution and shall
endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution
including long-range transboundary air pollution’.25
As a signiﬁcant ‘ﬁrst step’ towards ﬁrm obligations to control and reduce air
pollution and LRTAP,26 the majority of the original parties have adhered to the
vague general obligation expressed in Article 2 – but assessing compliance poses some
difﬁcult analytical problems. Ultimately, the successful adoption of the Protocols has
determined the signiﬁcance and effectiveness of the Convention.27 The Protocols are
characterized by good levels of compliance (see Table 1 in the Appendix to this
article).28 From a simple compliance perspective, the regime is effective because the
contracting parties in general have fulﬁlled their commitments, bar a few cases of
non-compliance concerning data reporting and the reduction of individual pollutants.
The commitments on nitrogen oxide (NOX), volatile organic compounds (VOCs),
and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have proved difﬁcult for some states to
achieve.29 The Protocols were recently amended; this is addressed in Section 2.4.
Implementation and the importance of the European Union
European Union (EU) air pollution law was partly adopted to fulﬁl the commitments
under the LRTAP regime.30 The EU (formerly the European (Economic) Community
22 J. Wettestad, ‘The 1999 Multi-Pollutant Protocol: A Neglected Break-Through in Solving Europe’s Air
Pollution Problems?’, in O.S. Stokke & O.B. Thommessen (eds), Yearbook of International Co-
operation on Environment and Development 2001–02 (Earthscan, 2001), pp. 35–41, at 35.
23 A. Rosencranz, ‘The ECE Convention of 1979 on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’ (1981) 75(4)
American Journal of International Law, pp. 975–82, at 980; see also J. Brunnée,Acid Rain andOzone Layer
Depletion: International Law and Regulation (Transnational, 1988), at pp. 177–80; L. Gündling, ‘Multi-
lateral Co-operation of States under the ECE Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution’, in
C. Flinterman, B. Kwiatkowska & J.G. Lammers (eds), Transboundary Air Pollution (Martinus Nijhoff,
1986), pp. 19–32, at 22; G. Wetstone & A. Rosencranz, Acid Rain in Europe and North America:National
Responses to an International Problem (Environmental Law Institute, 1983), pp. 140–3.
24 Rosencranz, ibid., at p. 977; Sands & Peel, n. 4 above, at p. 247.
25 Art. 2 CLRTAP.
26 T.A. Heywood, ‘Environmental Modiﬁcation: Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution’ (1980) 21 Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 536–40, at 536, citing UN Doc. ECE/
HLM.1/R.1 (1979), reprinted in (1979) 18 International Legal Materials 1442.
27 Ibid., at p. 540; G. Wetstone & A. Rosencranz, ‘Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search for an
International Response’ (1984) 8 Harvard Environmental Law Review, pp. 89–138, at 107.
28 J. Wettestad, ‘Acid Lessons? Assessing and Explaining LRTAP Implementation and Effectiveness’,
Working Paper 96-18 (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1996), at p. 63.
29 In the case of NOX, this is because of its diffuse origin (road transport and coastal/inland water transport).
30 See J.H. Jans & H.B. Vedder, European Environmental Law After Lisbon (Europa Law, 2012),
pp. 419–28, at 419.
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(EEC/EC)) acceded to the majority of the Protocols, but lacked the required support
to approve the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I31 and the 1991 VOCs Protocol.32 After the
1992 Maastricht Treaty,33 EU policy on the environment became the driving force in
the internal EU context, with the LRTAP instruments supplementing this process.
Law and policy relevant to LRTAP did exist in the EU prior to the adoption of the
CLRTAP in 197934 and, during the period 1980 to 1992, the EU legislated on a broad
range of pollutants, with a focus on pollution sources.35 Two Directives from this
period were speciﬁcally linked to the LRTAP regime: Directive 84/360/EEC on the
Combating of Air Pollution from Industrial Plants (Air Framework Directive),36 which
created emission limit values for new plants, and Directive 88/609/EEC on the
Limitation of Emissions of certain Pollutants into the Air from Large Combustion
Plants (Large Combustion Plants Directive),37 which set reduction targets for existing
plants. The decentralized approach taken in these Directives was in keeping with the
1985 Sulphur Protocol I,38 and was a progenitor to national emissions ceilings.39 After
the major milestone of Directive 96/62/EC on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and
Management (Air Quality Framework Directive),40 there was a notable growth in EU
air pollution legislation. Four daughter Directives to the Air Quality Framework
Directive created limit values and target values for a range of pollutants (1999–2004),41
and Directive 2001/81/EC established National Emission Ceilings for Certain
Atmospheric Pollutants.42 In 2001, the Commission launched the Clean Air for
Europe (CAFE) Programme,43 which produced a Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution.44
31 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent,
Helsinki (Finland), 8 July 1985, in force 2 Sept. 1987, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/
sulf_h1.html.
32 Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Trans-
boundary Fluxes, Geneva (Switzerland), 18 Nov. 1991, in force 29 Sept. 1997, available at:
http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/vola_h1.html.
33 Treaty on European Union, Maastricht (Netherlands), 7 Feb. 1992, in force 1 Nov. 1993, available at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT.
34 Beginning with Directive 70/220/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States relating
to Measures to be taken against Air Pollution by Gases from Positive-Ignition Engines of Motor
Vehicles [1970] OJ L 76/1. See the Directives listed at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/auto-
motive/documents/directives/directive-70-220-eec_en.htm.
35 For a summary see S. Heise, ‘The Regulatory Approach of the EEC to Air Quality’ (1990) 93
The Science of the Total Environment, pp. 81–94. See also http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/legis.htm.
36 [1984] OJ L 188/20.
37 [1988] OJ L 336/1.
38 N. 31 above.
39 See M. Eames, ‘The Large Combustion Plant Directive (88/609/EEC): An Effective Instrument for SO2
Pollution Abatement?’, in M. Glachant (ed.), Implementing European Environmental Policy: The
Impacts of Directives in the Member States (Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 59–98.
40 [1996] OJ L 296/55; see J. Wettestad, ‘The EU Air Quality Framework Directive: Shaped and Saved by
Interaction?’, in S. Oberthür & T. Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental
Governance: Synergy and Conﬂict among International and EU Policies (The MIT Press, 2006),
pp. 285–306, at 285.
41 See the Directives listed at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/quality/legislation/existing_leg.htm.
42 [2001] OJ L 309/22.
43 COM(2001)0245 ﬁnal.
44 COM(2005)446 ﬁnal, 21 Sept. 2005.
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Consistent with this strategy was Directive 2008/50/EC on Ambient Air Quality and
Cleaner Air for Europe,45 and Directive 2008/1/EC concerning Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control (IPPC Directive).46
EU law has certainly gone beyond the boundaries of the LRTAP regime, but its
developments still reﬂect the spirit of the regime, particularly the 1999 Gothenburg
Protocol47 in the recent period.48 There is a signiﬁcant degree of overlap and linkage
between the EU and the LRTAP regime in terms of the institutions, participating
states, the actors involved, and the norms and rules.49 The latter still has a signiﬁcant
advantage in terms of its broader international membership.50 Nonetheless, the EU
has made substantial contributions to the effectiveness of the LRTAP regime.
2.2. The Use of Binding/Non-binding Instruments
Non-binding instruments played a key role in the regime’s early formation. For
example, Sweden and a group of like-minded states agreed to reduce their sulphur
emissions by 30% (the ‘30% Club’) in the Declaration on Acid Rain 1984.51
Motivated by the slow progress at the international level and their desire to move
forward on the effects of acid rain, the 30% Club gained political leverage and
shamed uncooperative states. It signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the development of the 1985
Sulphur Protocol I,52 which replicated the 30% commitment.53 However, when a
similar approach was taken four years later with the Soﬁa Declaration on 30%
Reduction of NOX Emissions,
54 adopted concurrently with the 1988 NOX
Protocol,55 the limitations of non-binding instruments became apparent. Only three
of the 12 states that adopted the Soﬁa Declaration achieved the 30% reduction in
NOX emissions by 1998, and the Declaration had little effect on NOX reductions.
Furthermore, it did not inﬂuence the regime’s implementation strategies, which were
advancing towards national emissions ceilings (NECs) by the early 1990s and no
longer required generic across-the-board reductions for NOX.
56 The difference in
45 [2008] OJ L 152/1. This replaced Directive 96/62/EC and incorporated the four daughter Directives.
46 (Codiﬁed version) [2008] OJ L 24/8.
47 Protocol to Abate Acidiﬁcation, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, Gothenburg (Sweden),
30 Nov. 1999, in force 15 May 2005, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/multi_h1.html.
48 See Jans & Vedder, n. 30 above, at p. 423; C. Ågren, ‘The Role and Views of Environmental
Organizations’, in J. Sliggers & W. Kakebeeke (eds), Clearing the Air: 25 Years of the Convention on
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (UNECE, 2004), pp. 133–48, at 137.
49 H. Selin & S.D. VanDeever, ‘Institutional Linkages and European Air Pollution Politics’, in Lidskog &
Sundqvist, n. 4 above, pp. 61–91, at pp. 61–7.
50 Ågren, n. 48 above.
51 Canada–Europe Ministerial Conference on Acid Rain, Ottawa (Canada), 21 Mar. 1984, (1984) 23
International Legal Materials 662.
52 N. 31 above.
53 See Brunnée, n. 23 above, at pp. 180–82; McCormick, n. 21 above, at pp. 79–80.
54 Soﬁa (Bulgaria), 31 Oct. 1988.
55 Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, Soﬁa
(Bulgaria), 31 Oct. 1988, in force 14 Feb. 1991, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/nitr_h1.html.
56 J.B. Skjærseth, O.S. Stokke & J. Wettestad, ‘Soft Law, Hard Law, and Effective Implementation of
International Environmental Norms’ (2006) 6 Global Environmental Politics, pp. 104–20, at 109–11.
See also J. Wettestad, ‘Participation in NOX Policy-Making and Implementation in the Netherlands,
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impact between the Declaration on Acid Rain and the Declaration on 30% Reduction
of NOX Emissions may well be explained by their different origins. The former
was an attempt led by Scandinavian states to move the regime towards binding
commitments, whereas the latter was heavily backed by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). This may explain why state incentives to comply were low.57
In terms of effectiveness, the LRTAP regime conforms with Bodansky’s assertion
that non-binding instruments tend to be used at regime formation, and can contribute
to ‘learning by doing’.58 However, there is evidently a trade-off between legality and
participation. As the regime has evolved, binding instruments have produced
the more sophisticated elements (NECs, for example). EU law has also ﬁrmed up
the LRTAP commitments, for the EU Member States at least. Contrasted to this is the
lack of participation by some of the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and
Central Asia (EECCA), which may be better served by soft law instruments. These
could maintain the regime’s proﬁle and provide the states with political leverage to
gain ﬁnancial and technical support from the advanced economies. To some extent,
this is now occurring through the establishment of the EECCA Coordinating
Group.59 Each case is singular and involves speciﬁc trade-offs, which makes it
extremely problematic to evaluate how effectively a regime uses non-binding
instruments, or whether the binding/non-binding ratio is optimal. Nevertheless, it
would appear that, on balance, the regime has beneﬁted from the use of binding
instruments, although there is scope to use non-binding instruments more effectively
to foster participation in the regime.
2.3. The Precision of the Rules
The Convention and its Protocols moved from vagueness to precision as the regime
matured. The Convention’s substantive provisions are mandatory, yet represent general
principles as opposed to ﬁrm commitments as a result of the presence of qualifying
clauses and soft law expressions. This generates vagueness: it is difﬁcult to ascertain
speciﬁc cases of non-compliance.60 However, imprecision is also an asset, for it provides
ﬂexibility and facilitates participation in the Convention process. From this perspective,
the Convention arguably is effective not despite but because of its vagueness.61
The Protocols contain precise rules and fewer qualifying expressions. The 30%
Club viewed binding commitments as providing the best outcome for the
UK, and Norway: Different Approaches but Similar Results?’, in D.G. Victor, K. Raustiala &
E. Skolnikoff (eds), The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments:
Theory and Practice (The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 381–429.
57 Levy, n. 4 above, at p. 60.
58 Bodansky, n. 8 above, at p. 264.
59 Report of the 1st session of the Coordinating Group on Promotion of Actions towards Implementation
of the CLRTAP in EECCA, Working Group of Strategies and Review, 48th Session, 11–15 Apr. 2011,
Geneva (Switzerland), Informal Doc. No. 21.
60 See Gündling, n. 23 above; Brunnée, n. 23 above, at pp. 175–85.
61 See the conclusions of P.H. Sand, ‘Regional Approaches to Transboundary Air Pollution’, in J.L. Helm
(ed.), Energy: Production, Consumption, and Consequences (National Academy Press, 1990),
pp. 246–64, at 257.
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environment. In Article 2 of the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I62 states agreed to reduce
‘national annual sulphur emissions or their transboundary ﬂuxes by at least 30 per
cent’ of 1980 levels.63 The shift to ﬁrm reduction commitments raised the stakes and
resulted in parties deciding not to accede to the Protocol, including a number of key
states such as Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and
Yugoslavia. However, although legally precise, scholars have questioned the
Protocol’s real impact. It has been suggested that the 30% target was achieved
primarily through de-industrialization and changes in energy policy unrelated to the
parties’ implementation efforts.64
Subsequent Protocols developed speciﬁcation standards in the form of recommen-
datory Annexes. These became progressively mandatory and stringent in nature. The
regime has attempted to prioritize precision over vagueness but, inevitably, ﬂexible
standards have been deployed when negotiating parties could not agree on ﬁrm rules.
Yet, overall, greater precision has increased effectiveness by reducing uncertainty and
making cases of non-compliance more readily observable.65 The regime conforms to
the idea of trade-offs, with a core group prepared to move forward on emissions
reductions even though a sizeable number of states may not ratify the Protocols.
This may be a better outcome for the environment than the alternative – namely the
possibility that no international standards are adopted.
The regime adopts a cautious approach towards the application of international
environmental law principles to LRTAP. The Trail Smelter Arbitration is a
precedent;66 the emergence of the ‘no harm’ principle contained in Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration 197267 had a clear inﬂuence (repeated in the CLRTAP
Preamble), but more recent principles feature less prominently. The principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities68 and the concept of sustainable
62 N. 31 above.
63 The participation of the USSR was only secured with the inclusion of ‘transboundary ﬂuxes’, as the
majority of its emissions did not affect neighbouring countries because of the ‘prevailing westerly
winds’: McCormick, n. 21 above, at p. 80.
64 E.J. Ringquist & T. Kostadinova, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agree-
ments: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol’ (2005) 49 American Journal of Political Science,
pp. 86–102, at 99; Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, n. 4 above, pp. 348–49; L. Björkbom, ‘Thoughts about
the Dynamics behind the Process: The Role of Externalities’, in Sliggers & Kakebeeke, n. 48 above,
pp. 20–4, at 24.
65 See D. Bodansky, ‘Rules vs. Standards in International Environmental Law’ (2004) 98 Proceedings of
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), pp. 275–80, at 277.
66 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), (1941) 3 Reports of International Arbitration
Awards 1905, reprinted in (1941) 35 American Journal of International Law, pp. 684–736, at 716. See
R.M. Bratspies & R.A. Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law: Lessons from the
Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
67 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm (Sweden),
16 June 1972, (1972) 11 International Legal Materials, pp. 1416–20. See L.B. Sohn, ‘The Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment’ (1973) 14 Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 423–515.
The ‘no harm’ principle was further strengthened by Principle 2, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, UNCED, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Vol. I), 14 June 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.
htm.
68 Rio Declaration, ibid., Principle 7. A weaker version of this principle is included, however, in the form
of differentiated responsibilities for the economies in transition (EIT) countries: see F. Biermann, Saving
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development69 are under-represented in the legal agreements. The provisions on
information exchange and consultation notwithstanding, formal obligations
to undertake environmental impact assessments are absent.70 The regime has
incorporated precautionary approaches in the Preambles to the Protocols from 1994
onwards.71 Because the science is well established for the speciﬁed pollutants,
scientiﬁc uncertainty is now rarely cited as a reason for delaying action on LRTAP.72
Environmental principles mostly emerged after the CLRTAP was adopted. Later
Protocols failed to integrate them substantially. This results in a signiﬁcant degree
of ambiguity concerning their role, and inﬂuences implementation strategies.
Nonetheless, the regime has been relatively successful in using precise rules and a
narrow understanding of environmental principles. However, it is argued that the
incorporation of the remaining environmental principles would reduce ambiguity and
therefore increase effectiveness.
2.4. Implementation Strategies
The LRTAP regime has developed a ﬁrm basis in command-and-control techniques.73
In the 1979 Convention, states could only agree on a generic performance standard
for national control measures based on the concept of best available technology
economically feasible (the BATEF standard).74 The 30% reduction target applicable
to all states in the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I75 was considered too inﬂexible to achieve
higher sulphur emissions reductions, although the target was achieved.76 Technology-
speciﬁc and environmental quality requirements were necessary, but politically
difﬁcult to achieve. Signatory states needed to balance sovereignty concerns and the
accommodation of national industries and interests with the need for a level playing
ﬁeld and a greater focus on environmental vulnerability. The argument shifted in
favour of standardization and environmental quality, but the tension has never been
fully resolved.
the Atmosphere: International Law, Developing Countries and Air Pollution (Peter Lang, 1995), at
pp. 38–40.
69 Mentioned only in the Preamble to the Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions,
Oslo (Norway), 14 June 1994, in force 5 Aug. 1998 (1994 Sulphur Protocol II), available at:
http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/fsulf_h1.html.
70 According to L.A. Kimball (‘Treaty Implementation: Scientiﬁc and Technical Advice Enters a New
Stage’, American Society of International Law Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 28 (ASIL,
1996), at p. 246) Art. 8(b) CLRTAP is ‘a form of EIA notiﬁcation’. However, the exact parameters of
the obligation to consult were never deﬁned. See Heywood, n. 26 above, at p. 539; Rosencranz, n. 23
above, at p. 977; and Gündling, n. 23 above, at p. 24.
71 Rio Declaration, n. 67 above, Principle 15.
72 On the political uses of science, see C.C. Parks, Acid Rain: Rhetoric and Reality (Routledge, 2013). It
has been estimated that there are ‘about 3000 anthropogenic air pollutants’, but only a few hundred
have been adequately studied: J. Fenger, ‘Air Pollution in the Last 50 Years – From Local to Global’
(2009) 43 Atmospheric Environment, pp. 13–22, at 16.
73 There are three major types of command-and-control: speciﬁcation standards (e.g. requiring the use of
a particular technology), performance standards (e.g. national emissions ceilings), and environmental
quality standards concerned with environmental vulnerability: see Bodansky, n. 8 above, pp. 75–80.
74 Arts 6–9 CLRTAP.
75 N. 31 above.
76 Sands and Peel, n. 4 above, at p. 249.
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The 1988 NOX Protocol
77 included the ‘critical loads’ concept, whereby European
areas are given a ‘quantitative estimate of the exposure to one or more pollutants below
which signiﬁcant harmful effects on speciﬁed sensitive elements of the environment do
not occur according to present knowledge’.78 The 1994 Sulphur Protocol II79 and the
1999 Gothenburg Protocol80 integrated these environmental quality standards and
introduced a general commitment not to exceed critical loads in the long term.81 Critical
loads are applied to the management of acidity and nutrient nitrogen (sulphur and
nitrogen). The ‘critical levels’ concept was also developed. This focuses on the health
and environmental effects of exposure to pollutant concentrations in the atmosphere, an
approach used for ground-level ozone, particulate matter, and ammonia.82 For the
remaining pollutants, the regime has used traditional approaches of bans, phase-outs,
limits, and restricted use, mainly as a result of the availability of alternatives.83
Haas and McCabe argue that the critical loads approach was ‘virtually revolu-
tionary in diplomacy’,84 because it attempted to assign national targets according to
environmental vulnerability. The translation into policy occurred through integrated
assessment models, such as the Regional Acidiﬁcation Information System (RAINS)
models.85 The models were developed in close cooperation with scientists and
policy makers, and had ‘considerable credibility’.86 Institutional support through
workshops of the Working Group on Strategies, together with the use of three models,
fostered respect for the process and contributed to an impression of ﬂexibility.87
However, although RAINS modelled least cost-reduction scenarios, and the
5% most sensitive areas in each grid of the critical loads map were excluded from the
reduction targets on the ground of costs,88 the states negotiated a weaker general
emissions reduction target in the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, again citing costs.
77 N. 55 above.
78 Ibid., Art. 1(7).
79 N. 69 above.
80 N. 47 above.
81 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, n. 69 above, Art. 2(1). See K.R. Bull, ‘Critical Loads – Possibilities and
Constraints’ (1995) 85(1) Water, Air and Soil Pollution, pp. 201–12.
82 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, ibid., Art. 1(9). The World Health Organization (WHO) Air Quality Guidelines
inﬂuenced the determination of these levels: for the most recent version see ‘WHO Air Quality Guidelines
for Particulate Matter, Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide and Sulfur Dioxide: Global Update 2005 – Summary of
Risk Assessment’, available at: http://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/outdoorair_aqg/en.
83 See Fenger (n. 72 above, at p. 16) for the problems that arise using the substitution approach.
84 P.M. Haas and D. McCabe, ‘Ampliﬁers and Dampeners: International Institutions and Social Learning
in the Management of Global Environmental Risks’, in W.C. Clark (ed.), Learning to Manage Global
Environment Risks, Volume 1: Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone
Depletion, and Acid Rain (The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 323–48, at 327.
85 J. Alcamo et al. (eds), The RAINS Model of Acidiﬁcation: Science and Strategies in Europe (Kluwer,
1990); A. Patt, ‘Analytic Frameworks and Politics: The Case of Acid Rain in Europe’, ENRP
Discussion Paper E-98-20, (Harvard, 1998), at p. 9; W. Tuinstra, L. Hordijk & M. Amann, ‘Using
Computer Models in International Negotiations: The Case of Acidiﬁcation in Europe’ (1999) 41(9)
Environment, pp. 33–42, at 36. See also G. Sundqvist, M. Letell & R. Lidskog, ‘Science and Policy in
Air Pollution Abatement Strategies’ (2002) 5(2) Environmental Science & Policy, pp. 147–56.
86 Tuinstra, Hordijk & Amann, ibid., at p. 38; B. Siebenhüner, ‘Transboundary Science for Transnational
Air Pollution Policies in Europe’, in Lidskog & Sundqvist, n. 4 above, pp. 93–122, at 100.
87 Tuinstra, Hordijk & Amann, ibid., pp. 38–9.
88 Levy, n. 4 above, at p. 62.
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The Protocol aimed to reduce the gap between critical loads and emissions by 60%
(60% gap closure).89 Gap closure was referred to again in the 1999 Gothenburg
Protocol. Because of these compromises, the regime could be criticized for being biased
towards economic concerns, rather than achieving optimal environmental outcomes.90
The European Commission was so dissatisﬁed with the Gothenburg Protocol’s
emissions reduction commitments, for example, that it did not sign it.91 The EU
acceded in 2003, after the adoption of more stringent NECs in Directive 2001/81/EC,92
reasoning that implementation of the Gothenburg Protocol would ‘contribute to
achieving Community goals for protection of the environment and human health’.93
Scientiﬁc uncertainty regarding critical loads also remains an issue, and precaution is
needed when considering the exceedance boundaries.94 Despite these concerns, the
critical loads approach remains a superior method to the politically unpalatable across-
the-board imposition of emissions reduction. If the gap between emissions and critical
loads is successfully closed, it will be a remarkable achievement.
The 1988 NOX Protocol had a non-mandatory Technical Annex on Control
Technologies. Subsequent Protocols attempted to develop mandatory standards on
control technologies and measures, alongside the mandatory emissions limits and content
levels. Many of these were based on what states had agreed to elsewhere,95 or on
domestic/EU legislation. The BATEF standard, which integrates cost effectiveness and
technology, moulded these developments. A tangible impact of the standard is the regime’s
preference for end-of-pipe technical solutions (for example, the catalytic converter).96
89 R.R. Churchill, G. Kütting & L.M. Warren, ‘The 1994 UN ECE Sulphur Protocol’ (1995) 7(2) Journal
of Environmental Law, pp. 169–97, at 196.
90 G. Kütting, ‘A Critical Approach to Institutional and Environmental Effectiveness: Lessons from the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’, in D. Stevis & V.J. Assetto (eds), The
International Political Economy of the Environment: Critical Perspectives (Lynne Rienner, 2001),
pp. 181–98, at p. 191.
91 H. Selin & S.D. VanDeveer, ‘Mapping Institutional Linkages in European Air Pollution Politics’ (2003)
3(3) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 14–46, at 36.
92 COM(2001)0245 ﬁnal; Directive 2001/81/EC on National Emission Ceilings for Certain Atmospheric
Pollutants [2001] OJ L 309/22.
93 2003/507/EC: Council Decision on the Accession of the European Community to the Protocol to the
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidiﬁcation, Eutrophication
and Ground-Level Ozone [2003] OJ L 179/1, recital 3.
94 See R.A. Skefﬁngton, ‘Quantifying Uncertainty in Critical Loads: (a) Literature Review’ (2006) 169
Water, Air, and Soil Pollution, pp. 3–24. The European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme
(EMEP) has gradually increased the critical load map resolution from 150 x 150 km2 to 6 x 11 km2.
This will require an increase in data quality and should improve knowledge on exceedances: Decision
2012/13, ECE/EB.AIR/113/Add.1. Note all Executive Body Decisions referenced in this article are
available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/executivebody/eb_decision.html.
95 A key inﬂuence were regs 15, 40 and 96 of the UNECE Agreement concerning the Adoption of
Uniform Technical Prescriptions for Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and Parts which can be ﬁtted and/or
be used on Wheeled Vehicles and the Conditions for Reciprocal Recognition of Approvals Granted on
the Basis of these Prescriptions 1958/1994, Geneva (Switzerland), 20 Mar. 1958, in force 20 June 1959
(amended 18 Aug. 1994, in force 16 Oct. 1995), available at: http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/
wp29regs.html. The Agreement concerning the Establishing of Global Technical Regulations for
Wheeled Vehicles 1998 (Geneva (Switzerland), 25 June 1998, in force 25 Aug. 2000, available at:
http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29gen/wp29glob.html) globalized the 1958/1994
Agreement.
96 See L. Lindau, A. Jagusiewicz & E. Kovacs, ‘Software and Hardware, No Protocols Without Tech-
nologies’, in Sliggers & Kakebeeke, n. 48 above, pp. 45–58, at 50.
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During the early period of the regime, this standard offered a viable route to
achieving reductions, but the limits are being reached.97 The BATEF standard has
attracted criticism because it enables states to prioritize economic considerations over
environmental outcomes, depending on the weighting. It may thus serve to justify
inaction by those unwilling to invest in pollution abatement measures.98
The shift to the term ‘best available techniques’ (BAT) has somewhat diffused
this criticism, and commitments to promote renewable energy were ﬁnally
included in the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II.99 Kelly and his co-authors suggest that
to remain effective, the LRTAP regime is likely to need to embrace ‘alternative
approaches to emission reductions’.100 Furthermore, as Kütting has noted, the
‘predominance of fossil fuels’ in the UNECE economies has not been signiﬁcantly
questioned.101
The 1999 Gothenburg Protocol expanded implementation strategies by simultaneously
attempting to regulate sulphur, NOX, VOCs and ammonia emissions (hence, it has
been described as the Multi-Effect Protocol). Flexible approaches to reductions were
tentatively included, such as the recommended VOC reduction-offsetting scheme.102
There are no provisions for international emissions trading, although some states
have implemented national schemes.103 The Executive Body (EB) has issued guidance
on the various options, including the possibility of achieving co-beneﬁts on climate
change with the EU emissions trading scheme.104 The Protocol requires states to
phase out market-based incentives for the regulated pollutants (such as tax
exemptions and subsidies).105 Thus, to an extent, structural issues are now being
addressed.
The recent Protocol amendments have not diverged from this regulatory approach.
The 2009 POPs Protocol amendments put in place further restrictions and regulate
additional POPs, provide new emission limit values for waste incineration, and
provide BAT guidance to control emissions.106 The 2012 Heavy Metals Protocol
97 A. Kelly et al., ‘Setting National Emission Ceilings for Air Pollutants: Policy Lessons from an
Ex-post Evaluation of the Gothenburg Protocol’ (2010) 13(1) Environmental Science & Policy,
pp. 28–41, at 40.
98 E.g., Poland refused to ratify the 1985 SO2 Protocol I (n. 31 above) on the grounds of economic
feasibility: Gündling, n. 23 above, at p. 22; McCormick, n. 21 above, at p. 85.
99 N. 69 above, Art. 2(4).
100 Kelly et al., n. 97 above, at p. 40.
101 Kütting, n. 90 above, at p. 195.
102 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, n. 47 above, Appendix II.
103 E.g. the US Acid Rain Program: see R. Schmalensee et al., ‘An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide
Emissions Trading’ (1998) 12 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 53–68, at 54–6.
104 Decision 2012/9, ECE/EB.AIR/113/Add.1, Adoption of Guidance Document on Economic Instru-
ments to Reduce Emissions of Regional Air Pollutants to the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidiﬁcation,
Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone; see the Guidance Document on Economic Instruments,
19 July 2013, available at: http://www.unece.org/ﬁleadmin/DAM/env/documents/2013/air/eb/ECE_EB.
AIR_118_ENG_01.pdf.
105 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, n. 47 above, Art. 6(h).
106 Decision 2009/1, Amendment of the Text of and Annexes I, II, III, IV, VI and VIII to the 1998
Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants; Decision 2009/2, Listing of Short-Chain Chlorinated
Parafﬁns and Polychlorinated Naphtalenes in Annexes I and II to the 1998 Protocol on Persistent
Organic Pollutants; Decision 2009/3, Amendment of Annexes V and VII to the 1998 Protocol on
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amendments provide stricter emission limit values for the speciﬁed sources, and
extend the source categories.107 The 2012 Gothenburg Protocol amendments set new
2020 emissions ceilings for existing pollutants as well as for PM and black soot.108
Economic uncertainty and austerity, however, led states to water down their
commitments in line with economic projections to 2020. The 2012 Gothenburg
Protocol amendments do not appear to have gone much further than business-as-
usual.109 As Ågren notes, it is ‘a great disappointment that the overall level
of ambition is still far from sufﬁcient to adequately protect health and the
environment’.110
There is no deﬁnitive answer to which regulatory approach is more effective
(command-and-control or market-based), nor whether it is better to have a regulatory
mix. As Bodansky notes, the problem ‘lies less in formulating desirable policy options
than in getting these policies adopted and implemented’.111 For this reason, assessing
the effectiveness of the commitments is difﬁcult because ultimately their success
relies on political will. This analysis points to a certain degree of muddling
through, and highlights the trade-offs made to achieve agreement. States cannot be
prevented from negotiating weaker reduction commitments, and the effects-
based approach to LRTAP was not a complete solution to state ambivalence. The
regime has an unfortunate dynamic whereby the required emissions reductions are
perhaps too lenient for developed states, but are perceived by the states with
economies in transition (EIT) as complex and costly to implement.112 This is
particularly concerning if we recall that the LRTAP regime is weak in terms
of recognizing common but differentiated responsibilities. Thus, in adopting
relatively advanced implementation strategies, a degree of state participation may
have been sacriﬁced.
Persistent Organic Pollutants, ECE/EB.AIR/99/ADD.1, Geneva (Switzerland), 18 Dec. 2009, not yet
in force, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/pops_h1.html.
107 Decision 2012/6, Amendment of Annex III to the 1998 Protocol on Heavy Metals, in force; Decision
2012/5, Amendments to the Text of and Annexes Other than III and VII to the 1998 Protocol on
Heavy Metals, ECE/EB.AIR/113/Add.1, Geneva (Switzerland), 13 Dec. 2012, not yet in force.
Consolidated text available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/hm_h1.html.
108 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, n. 47 above, Art. 18 bis. See Decision 2012/1, Amendment of Annex I to
the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidiﬁcation, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone (in force 19 Sept.
2013) and Decision 2012/2, Amendment of the Text of and Annexes II to IX to the 1999 Protocol to
Abate Acidiﬁcation, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone and the Addition of New Annexes X
and XI, ECE/EB.AIR/111/Add.1, not yet in force. For a consolidated text, see http://www.unece.org/
env/lrtap/multi_h1.html. Once in force, the amended Gothenburg Protocol will supersede and replace
the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I, 1988 NOX Protocol, 1991 VOCs Protocol, and 1994 Sulphur
Protocol II.
109 S. Reis et al., ‘From Acid Rain to Climate Change’ (2012) 338 (6111) Science, pp. 1153–4, at
1154. See also J.-P. Hettelingh et al., ‘Assessing Effects of the Revised Gothenburg Protocol’, in
M. Posch, J.Slootweg & J.-P. Hettelingh (eds), Modelling and Mapping of Atmospherically-Induced
Ecosystem Impacts in Europe, CCE Status Report 2012 (RIVM, 2012), pp. 13–20.
110 C. Ågren, ‘Editorial’ (June 2012 No. 2) Acid News, at p. 2, available at: http://www.airclim.org/
acidnews/2012/AN2-12.
111 Bodansky, n. 8 above, p. 84.
112 L.B. Andonova, ‘Acid Rain in a Wider Europe: The Post-Communist Transition and the Future
European Acid Rain Policies’, in G.R. Visgilio & D.M. Whitelaw (eds), Acid in the Environment:
Lessons Learned and Future Prospects (Springer, 2007), pp. 151–74, at 165–7.
14 Transnational Environmental Law
3. effectiveness and institutional design of
the lrtap regime
3.1. The Core Institutions
The core institutional feature established by the CLRTAP was the EB, with its
subsidiary bodies and Bureau (an inter-sessional forum).113 The European
Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) has also been a key supporting
body.114 The Executive Secretary of the UNECE is designated the Secretariat, with
the Secretariat functions provided by the Air Pollution Section of the UNECE
Environment and Human Settlement Division.115 Currently there are three subsidiary
bodies to the EB: (i) the Working Group on Effects (WGE);116 (ii) the EMEP Steering
Body,117 with four task forces and four EMEP Centres;118 and (iii) the Working
Group on Strategies and Review (WGSR), the principal negotiating body.119 The
regime has a well-developed institutional framework, is supported by a range of
subsidiary bodies, and has established links with international institutions.
Studies focusing on the regime’s early period (the 1980s and 1990s) have viewed it
as institutionally effective and dynamic.120 Indeed, the initial institutional framework
contributed to the regime’s later successes. The institutions are viewed as having
aided state cooperation, consensus, and the negotiation of the Protocols.121 The
WGSR has been particularly important for the interaction of science and policy.122
The subsidiary bodies have beneﬁted from a relatively good exchange of information
through national reporting, which has aided transparency. This has enabled
113 Art. 10 CLRTAP. The EB is composed of representatives of the parties to the Convention, and meets
at least annually. It is responsible for implementation and review: see http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/
executivebody/welcome.html. The Bureau consists of the EB Chair and seven Vice-Chairs (including
the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies). Its focus is on strategy, coordination and cooperation, and it may
submit policy proposals to the EB: see http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/executivebody/ebbureauhome.html.
114 See UNECE, ‘EMEP: The Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe’ (1982) Economic Bulletin for Europe, pp. 29–40;
H. Dovland, ‘Monitoring European Transboundary Air Pollution’ (1987) 29(10) Environment,
pp. 10–28.
115 Art. 11 CLRTAP; the Secretariat convenes and prepares meetings of the EB and communicates
information among the parties.
116 Consisting of six International Cooperative Programmes (ICPs) and their research centres, focusing on
environmental issues, materials, integrated monitoring, modelling and mapping. The WHO leads a task
force on health. There is also a joint expert group on dynamic modelling. For details on state partici-
pation with the programmes, see http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/WorkingGroups/wge/participation.
html.
117 Consisting of representatives from the parties to the Convention, the four EMEP Centres, the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the European Environment Agency (EEA).
118 These focus on emissions inventories and projections, measurements and modelling, integrated
assessment modelling, meteorology, chemicals, and hemispheric air pollution.
119 The WGSR undertakes preparatory work (e.g. scientiﬁc and technical assessments) and negotiates
revisions of the Protocols, promotes technological exchange, and makes proposals for strategic
development: see http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/treaties/air-pollution/about-us/organization-
chart.html; and http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/workinggroups/wgs/welcome.html.
120 T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environmental Govern-
ance (Peter Lang, 1994), at pp. 193–4; Kütting, n. 90 above, at p. 183.
121 Munton et al., n. 4 above, at pp. 221–3.
122 Wettestad (2011), n. 4 above, at p. 52. See Siebenhüner, n. 86 above, at p. 104.
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methodological harmonization and the development and implementation of the
critical loads/levels approach.123 The regime is considered one of the most ‘science-
based’ in existence, and could be held up as a ‘model’ in this regard.124
A limitation of the regime is that no central funding mechanism exists. This
arrangement has not kept pace with the regime’s evolution and possibly jeopardizes
its institutional effectiveness. EMEP has a skewed funding system that relies mainly
on mandatory contributions from a few lead states (such as France, Germany,
and the UK). The majority of non-EMEP activities have been funded by donor
countries, or through the UNECE’s limited resources. The Secretariat relies on
these resources.125 It has been ‘overworked’ and has struggled at times to attend
meetings in host states.126 Despite these limitations, it has reportedly performed
its functions relatively successfully.127 The funding issue reﬂects the reluctant
agreement reached during the Convention negotiations and the state-centric
approach taken by the parties.128 Although aware of this weakness, in the early
2000s the parties failed to create a centralized funding mechanism to distribute costs
more fairly;129 instead, all parties were asked to contribute to the non-EMEP core
activities.130 To this end, the EB provided guidelines that followed the allocation
methods for the revised contributions to the 1984 EMEP Protocol.131 However, these
measures were inadequate and, in 2010, the new CLRTAP Long-term Strategy and
Implementation Action Plan reiterated the need for adequate funding of non-EMEP
core activities and of the Secretariat.132 Estimates in the 2014–15 Implementation
123 Munton et al., n. 4 above, at pp. 221–3; see L. Nordberg et al., ‘The Role of the Secretariat: Building
the Protocol Tree’, in Sliggers & Kakebeeke, n. 48 above, pp. 97–117, at 103–4. The critical loads
approach was developed primarily by the WGE and its ICPs, initially through workshops sponsored
by the Nordic Council of Ministers, and continued through the Task Force on Mapping at the
LRTAP Coordination Centre for Effects (CCE): see J. Nilsson & P. Grennfelt (eds), Critical Loads for
Sulphur and Nitrogen (Nord, 1988); J.P. Hettelingh et al. (eds), Mapping Critical Loads for Europe
(RIVM, 1991).
124 Sundqvist, Letell & Lidskog, n. 85 above, at p. 149; M.A. Levy, ‘European Acid Rain: The Power of
Tote-Board Diplomacy’, in P.M. Haas, R. Keohane & M. Levy (eds), Institutions for the Earth:
Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (The MIT Press, 1993), pp. 75–132, at
110; Wettestad (2002), n. 4 above, pp. 213–14; and Wettestad (2011), n. 4 above, at p. 52.
125 Wettestad (2002), ibid., at p. 212.
126 Levy, n. 124 above, at p. 84; a voluntary travel trust fund for the Secretariat was created by Decision
2006/12, Funding for Secretariat Travel, ECE/EB.AIR/89/Add.1.
127 Wettestad (2002), n. 4 above, at p. 213; see generally Nordberg et al., n. 123 above, pp. 97–117. For
an early account, see A. Tollan, ‘The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’
(1985) 19(6) Journal of World Trade Law, pp. 615–21.
128 See Wettestad (2002), ibid., at p. 215.
129 See Decision 2002/1, Financing of Core Activities (Annex I), ECE/EB.AIR/77/Add.1.
130 J.-P. Hettelingh et al., ‘Air Pollution Effects Drive Abatement Strategies’, in Sliggers & Kakebeeke
(eds), n. 48 above, pp. 59–84, at 73.
131 Amended Annex referred to in Article 4 of the 1984 Protocol on Long-term Financing of the
Cooperative Programme for EMEP, ECE/EB.AIR/91/Add.1, Annex II; Revised Scale of Contributions
to the Trust Fund for Core Activities not Covered by the EMEP Protocol 1984, referred to in para.
5 of Decision 2002/1, ECE/EB.AIR/91/Add.1, Annex III.
132 Decision 2010/18, Long-term strategy for the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
and Action Plan for its Implementation, ECE/EB.AIR/106/Add.1, Annex, Chapter V(16)(n)–(o);
Decision 2011/14, Action Plan for the Implementation of the Long-term Strategy for the Convention,
ECE/EB.AIR/109/Add.1.
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Work Plan133 indicated a budget shortfall of at least US$1 million. The regime
remains underfunded, and is arguably less effective consequently.
Funding weaknesses may be problematic if the regime attempts to create instit-
utional connections between other MEAs, or conduct outreach and knowledge-
sharing activities in the wider UNECE area/developing world (as promoted by the
Global Atmospheric Pollution (GAP) Forum).134 With regard to Europe, this issue
has created fewer difﬁculties. For example, in 1989 the UNECE and the Baltic Marine
Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding for cooperation with regard to data on airborne pollution.135
Furthermore, scientiﬁc collaboration has occurred through involvement in the Task
Force on Hemispheric Air Pollution, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), and the GAP Forum.136 According to Reis and his co-authors, the Task Force
on Reactive Nitrogen has developed ‘partnerships with UNEP and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as the biodiversity and water
conventions’.137 Such efforts need to be intensiﬁed; this will require enhanced
cooperation at a high institutional level and, consequently, better funding.
When considering the criteria for effectiveness, the CLRTAP highlights that
although we can take a holistic approach, not all criteria are equal – successfully
formed and functioning institutions are crucial. On a basic level the institutions
function well; however, opportunities for expanded activities are limited, and this
may reduce effectiveness in the long term.
3.2. International Implementation Procedures
Dispute settlement
The Convention contained no process for third-party settlement, and only required
parties to seek a solution by negotiation or by any other acceptable method.138 This
formulation was repeated verbatim in the Protocols up to the 1994 Sulphur Protocol
II, which added the possibility of submitting disputes to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). If states cannot agree on the mode of dispute settlement, they are
required to submit the dispute to a conciliation commission if requested by a party to
133 Executive Body, 32nd session, Geneva (Switzerland), 9–13 Dec. 2013, ECE/EB.AIR/122/Add.2.
134 E.g., ‘Strengthening Cooperation with Regional Air Pollution Networks and Initiatives outside the
Convention’, submitted by the Secretariat of the GAP Forum, Executive Body, 29th session, 12–16
Dec. 2011, Geneva (Switzerland), Informal Doc. No.12, available at: http://www.unece.org/ﬁleadmin/
DAM/env/documents/2011/eb/eb/n_12.pdf.
135 See J.A. Brunnée, ‘Jigsaw Puzzle of International Environmental Protection: International Approaches
to Atmospheric Pollution and the Baltic Sea Area’ (1992) 20 International Journal of Legal Infor-
mation, pp. 1–17, at 7.
136 Reis et al., n. 109 above, at p. 1154. The Convention is represented on the GAP Forum Steering
Committee: see http://www.sei-international.org/gapforum/participants.php.
137 Reis et al., ibid., at p. 1154; see the Task Force on Reactive Nitrogen (terms of reference Decision
2007/1, ECE/EB.AIR/91/Add.1), available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/taskforce/tfrn/welcome.
html. See also the Edinburgh Declaration on Reactive Nitrogen, Nitrogen & Global Change
Conference, Edinburgh (Scotland), 14 Apr. 2011, available at: http://www.nitrogen2011.org/publications.
html.
138 Art. 13 CLRTAP; Rosencranz, n. 23 above, at p. 980.
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the dispute. The commission may make a recommendatory award if appropriate, to
be respected in good faith.139 However, as is the case with numerous MEAs, no
formal disputes have arisen.140 The procedure possibly acts as an incentive to avoid
disputes and contributes to the culture of consensus. Alternatively, it may be that
dispute settlement provisions play a minimal role in determining the effectiveness
of the regime.141
Reporting, review, and non-compliance procedures
Reporting contributes to the regime’s effectiveness as it promotes transparency and is
an integral component of the compliance procedures. Initially framed as a
requirement to exchange available information in Article 8 of the Convention, the
1985 Sulphur Protocol I established dual reporting commitments with regard to
national emissions data and information on the programmes, policies and strategies
undertaken to achieve the Protocol’s commitments.142 As implementation strategies
became more complex, states were required to report on the implementation of their
commitments under the Protocols in general.143 The annual national reports and the
‘major reviews’ of Strategies and Policies for Air Pollution Abatement, which are
undertaken every four years, can be used for naming-and-shaming, although they
are not intended for this purpose.144 Data transparency is further aided by the
collaboration between the EMEP Centre on Emission Inventories and Projections and the
EEA, which enables the publication of the Air Pollutant Emission Inventory Guidebook
(formally CORe INventory AIR),145 and also through the European Pollutant Release
and Transfer Register (E-PRTR).146 The register collects data for a range of pollutants
(such as those resulting in LRTAP and climate change) by industrial source.
The Convention provided no clear non-compliance procedures. A major
development was the establishment of the Implementation Committee (IC) by
the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, which became the compliance procedure for
139 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, n. 69 above, Art. 9.
140 J. Sliggers, ‘Blue Skies Forever’, in Sliggers & Kakebeeke, n. 48 above, pp. 149–67, at 165.
141 For a general discussion see P. Sands & R. Mackenzie, ‘Annex 1: Guidelines for Negotiating and
Drafting Dispute Settlement Clauses for International Environmental Agreements’, in International
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed), International Investments and Protection of the
Environment: The Role of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Papers Emanating from the Second
Permanent Court of Arbitration International Law Seminar, May 17, 2000 (Kluwer Law
International, 2000).
142 N. 31 above, Arts 4 and 6.
143 Established by Art. 5 of the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, n. 69 above, and repeated in subsequent
Protocols. The reporting method is via questionnaire: see Nordberg et al., n. 123 above, at p. 107.
144 See Levy, n. 124 above, at p. 91; see also UNECE, Strategies and Policies for Air Pollution Abatement:
2010 Review, ECE/EB.AIR/123 (United Nations, 2013).
145 Available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/air/emep-eea-air-pollutant-emission-inventory-guide-
book/emep.
146 Available at: http://prtr.ec.europa.eu. See Regulation (EC) No. 166/2006 concerning the Establish-
ment of a European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register and Amending Directives 91/689/EEC
and 96/61/EC [2006] OJ L 33/1. This was created in part to fulﬁl the requirements of the Protocol on
Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Parti-
cipation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Kiev (Ukraine), 21 May
2003, in force 8 Oct. 2009, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/prtr/docs/prtrtext.html.
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all Protocols.147 It was modelled on the IC of the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer,148 which was developed in 1990–92.149 Its functions
include (i) the review of compliance with reporting obligations; (ii) consideration
of submissions or referrals,150 with the adoption of any necessary reports or
recommendations; (iii) the preparation of detailed compliance reports on speciﬁc
obligations; (iv) consideration of systemic compliance issues; and (v) the production
of annual compliance reports for the EB, with recommendations if necessary. The EB
may then adopt a decision on the non-compliance.151
The IC takes a facilitative and cooperative approach to non-compliance. Naming-
and-shaming happens in the EB decisions, which adopt language such as ‘express
disappointment’ and ‘note with concern’.152 EB decisions are likely to have the most
impact at state level, while the use of ofﬁcial international diplomatic routes and
publicity on the UNECE website may have a broader, if modest, outreach to the
public and the media. The activities of the IC notably improved the levels of reporting
after its ﬁrst compliance review153 – for example, reporting for the 1988 NOX
Protocol increased from 82% in 1998 to 99% in 2003.154
Serious cases of non-compliance have been rare, although the IC has dealt
with some lengthy periods of non-compliance by individual states, which have
attracted repeated EB decisions (see Table 1 at Appendix below). It is highly
unlikely that the naming-and-shaming approach will harden to include sanctions,155
while a further strengthening of the reporting requirements will only go so far in
achieving compliance with the reduction commitments.156 In Eastern Europe,
EU expansion is bringing greater indirect incentives for compliance, as states
that do not comply with the LRTAP-related Directives may be referred to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).157 Most scholars have concluded that the IC is
147 Sulphur Protocol II, n. 69 above, Art. 7. The IC’s structure, functioning and procedures were
established by Decision 1997/2, ECE/EB.AIR/53 and Decision 1998/3, EB.AIR/WG.5/52, Annex III;
these were amended in Decision 2006/2, ECE/EB.AIR/2006/2; and Decision 2012/25, ECE/EB.AIR/
113/Add.1. See T. Kuokkanen, ‘The Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution’, in
Ulfstein, n. 16 above, pp. 161–78.
148 Montreal (Canada), 16 Sept. 1987, in force 1 Jan. 1989, available at: http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/
en/montreal_protocol.php.
149 Patrick Széll, UK Department of the Environment, was the principal drafter for both procedures. See
P. Széll, ‘The Montreal Protocol: A New Legal Model for Compliance Control’, in P.G. Le Prestre,
J. Reid & T. Morehouse Jr (eds), Protecting the Ozone Layer: Lessons, Models, and Prospects
(Kluwer, 1998), at pp. 91–8.
150 This can occur through self-submission, submission by another party, a referral by the Secretariat, or
a referral though the Secretariat on the advice of the IC.
151 For details of states found in non-compliance, see Table 1 below.
152 P. Széll, V. Keizer & T. Kuokkanen, ‘Compliance and Consensus’, in Sliggers & Kakebeeke, n. 48
above, pp. 119–32, at 124.
153 Nordberg et al., n. 123 above, at pp. 106–7.
154 Széll, Keizer & Kuokkanen, n. 152 above, at p. 120. For the ‘Status of Reporting under CLRTAP’, see
http://www.ceip.at/ms/ceip_home1/ceip_home/status_reporting.
155 As the most recent EB Decisions on the Committee attest, see Decision 2012/25, n. 147 above.
156 See Sliggers, n. 140 above, at p. 165.
157 J. Wettestad, ‘Reducing Long-range Transport of Air Pollutants in Europe’, in S. Andresen,
E.L. Boasson & G. Hønneland (eds), International Environmental Agreements: An Introduction
(Routledge, 2011), pp. 23–37, at 33.
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effective, compliance levels have improved, and most states implement the IC’s
recommendations.158
4. the normative effectiveness of the lrtap regime
4.1. Legitimacy – Rules on Decision Making and Participation
According to Bodansky, the legitimacy of international environmental law is derived
through consensus, with states negotiating rules that they believe are fair and ‘in their
self-interest’, rather than through a recognition of ‘the rulemaking authority of
international institutions’.159 Based on state practice, the regime has high legitimacy
because states have been committed to the process for the past 35 years, during which
time signiﬁcant legal codiﬁcation has occurred.
Decision making is a key determinant of whether states view the process as
legitimate.160 Decision making by consensus provides greater legitimacy than
majority voting as common ground between states is found. However, it may slow
the rate of response to new developments and may lead to lowest-common-
denominator agreements, which are unambitious or ambiguous if they attempt to
include a range of competing state positions.161 Majority voting provides greater
ﬂexibility, but can lead to states opting out if allowed to.162 The CLRTAP resulted
from consensus-based decision making, and embedded this approach.163 Although
the EB decided to adopt the UNECE rules of procedure, which operate by majority
vote, for most of their history the Convention bodies have decided by consensus to
further the spirit of cooperation (although unanimity is not required).164 This
approach did not achieve full ratiﬁcation levels, but it secured the participation of the
willing, avoided conﬂict and therefore increased legitimacy.165 It did not prevent the
1980s Protocols from being considered lowest-common-denominator agreements,
although this is understandable given the Cold War context and the reluctance by the
polluting states to undertake international commitments.166 In 2010, the EB adopted
158 Sliggers, n. 140 above, at p. 165; Széll, Keizer & Kuokkanen, n. 152 above, at p. 125; T. Kuokkanen,
‘Practice of the Implementation Committee under the Convention on Long-range Air Pollution’, in
U. Beyerlin, P.-T. Stoll & R. Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), pp. 39–52, at
47; E. Milano, ‘Procedures and Mechanisms for Review of Compliance under the 1979 Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention and its Protocols’, in T. Treves et al. (eds),Non-Compliance
Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (TMC
Asser Press, 2009), pp. 169–80, at 180.
159 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law, pp. 596–624, at 604;
Bodansky, n. 8 above, at p. 89–90.
160 Bodansky, ibid., at p. 264.
161 Bodansky, ibid., at p. 170; see L.E. Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective
Global Agreements (Oxford University Press, 1994), at p. 14.
162 Bodansky, ibid., at p. 103.
163 Art. 12(3) CLRTAP.
164 Széll, Keizer & Kuokkanen, n. 152 above, at pp. 129–30.
165 Ibid.; Wettestad (2002), n. 4 above, at p. 212; see also Wettestad (2011), n. 4 above, at p. 52.
166 Levy, n. 4 above, at p. 59. For example, Sokolovsky describes the Convention negotiation as acrimonious:
V. Sokolovsky, ‘Fruits of a Cold War’, in Sliggers & Kakebeeke, n. 48 above, pp. 7–30, at 11.
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new rules of procedure for its sessions, which suggest that majority voting may play
an increased role in the regime.167
Participation is limited to the Member States and states with consultative status to
the UNECE.168 States must be a party to the CLRTAP to participate in the Protocols.
UNECE plays an important facilitative role and arguably provides a greater sense of
legitimacy and support to the Convention process.169 The symbolic and political
value of the East–West membership was a great asset.170 The recognition of the
EU (then the EEC) as a signatory to CLRTAP and subsequent Protocols was
considered a diplomatic breakthrough and a signiﬁcant episode of détente in the Cold
War.171
From the 1990s onwards, as the problem of hemispheric air pollution (POPs,
mercury, ozone, and particulate matter) gained prominence,172 the possibility was
mooted to amend the legal instruments so that states outside the UNECE region (such
as the Eastern Asia states) could participate in the regime. However, achieving
consensus on this issue was viewed as unlikely and time-intensive.173 The UNECE
membership criterion has possibly been a limiting factor in the post-Cold war era,
and highlights the need for global rather than regional approaches.174 The 1998
POPs Protocol175 had a substantial awareness-raising impact and was a contributing
factor to the successful adoption, in 2001, of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants.176 The 1998 Heavy Metals Protocol177 inﬂuenced the 2013
See the detailed analysis by E.M. Chossudovsky, ‘East–West’ Diplomacy for Environment in the
United Nations (UN Institute for Training and Research, 1988).
167 Decision 2010/19, ECE/EB.AIR/106/Add.1, rule 29.
168 Art. 14 CLRTAP.
169 The UNECE was chosen as the appropriate forum for the Convention process because of its East–West
membership and was referred to in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the 1973–75 Helsinki Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe, itself a Cold War forum: Final Act (Co-operation in the Field of
Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment), Helsinki (Finland), 1 Aug. 1975,
(1975) 14 International Legal Materials, pp. 1293–8, Ch. 5; see Chossudovsky, n. 166 above; Wetstone
& Rosencranz, n. 23 above, at p. 140; and R.G. Darst, Smokestack Diplomacy: Cooperation and
Conﬂict in East-West Environmental Politics (The MIT Press, 2001), at p. 95.
170 Wetstone & Rosencranz, n. 27 above, at pp. 105–6.
171 Arts 14(1) and 15 CLRTAP. See Chossudovsky, n. 166 above, pp. 93–8; Gehring, n. 120 above,
pp. 124–7.
172 See UNECE Air Pollution Studies Nos 16–20, Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution (HTAP),
prepared by the Task Force on HTAP (UN Geneva, 2007–10), available at: http://www.htap.org; see
also Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution 2010 Executive Summary, ECE/EB.AIR/2010/10
Corrected.
173 Art. 12 CLRTAP; Possibilities for Opening the Convention: Note by the Bureau in Consultation with
the Secretariat, Item 8 of the Provisional Agenda, 29 Sept. 2006, ECE/EB.AIR/2006/8, available at:
http://www.unece.org/ﬁleadmin/DAM/env/documents/2006/eb/EB/ece.eb.air.2006.8.e.pdf.
174 For a general discussion of global vs. regional options, see GAP Forum, ‘Atmospheric Pollution:
Developing a Global Approach’, Discussion Paper 2 (Stockholm Environment Institute, 2010).
175 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Aarhus (Denmark), 24 June 1998, in force 23 Oct. 2003,
available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/pops_h1.html.
176 Stockholm (Sweden), 22 May 2001, in force 17 May 2004, available at: http://www.pops.int.
See H. Selin, Global Governance of Hazardous Chemicals: Challenges of Multilevel Management
(The MIT Press, 2010), pp. 111–62.
177 Protocol on Heavy Metals, Aarhus (Denmark), 24 June 1998, in force 29 Dec. 2003, available at:
http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/hm_h1.html.
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Minamata Convention on Mercury, which addresses the intercontinental transport of
mercury.178 The regional agreements, programmes and action plans that were
developed through UNEP in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, after the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or Rio
Earth Summit)179 have broadly treated the CLRTAP as an exemplary system. The
main components for emulation are cooperation and the need for adequate air
pollution monitoring.180 The UN International Law Commission (ILC) has recently
begun preparatory work for global draft articles on the ‘protection of the
atmosphere’; the CLRTAP features in this work.181 If the CLRTAP participation
rules are a limitation, they have not precluded the parties from promulgating
international law in other forums. As a precedent, the regime has contributed to the
adoption of global treaties and rules on air pollution.
4.2. State Participation
Not all parties to the CLRTAP have ratiﬁed every Protocol. By 1988, the Convention
had 35 signatories and 32 parties.182 An important event in the regime’s history was
the string of accessions to the Convention by the newly independent states (NIS) in
Eastern Europe during the early 1990s. With the break-up of the Soviet Union (USSR)
and Yugoslavia, there are now 51 parties, including nearly every Western European
state, Turkey, the majority of the EECCA states, the US, and Canada.183 A smaller
group has ratiﬁed the Protocols. The advanced economies of Western Europe have
ratiﬁed all, or nearly all, of the Protocols. The smaller economies have selectively
ratiﬁed, primarily because of concerns over their stringency, the cost of compliance,
and the impact on their industrial development (Ireland and Greece, for example). A
small number of states (such as Turkey) have not ratiﬁed any pollution-speciﬁc
Protocols. However, all of the Protocols have entered into force, which is an
exceptional achievement. Hopefully, the recent amendments will achieve a similar
level of support.
178 Minamata (Japan), 10 Oct. 2013, not yet in force, available at: http://www.mercuryconvention.org.
179 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html.
180 See L. Nordberg, Air Pollution: Promoting Regional Cooperation (UNEP, 2010); UNEP, ‘Montevideo
Programme’, available at: http://www.unep.org/delc/MontevideoProgramme/tabid/54416/Default.
aspx. See also GAP Forum, ‘International Cooperation’, available at: http://www.sei-international.
org/gapforum/regions.php; N. Silva-Send, ‘Preventing Regional Air Pollution in Asia: The
Potential Role of the European Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution in
Asian Regions’, doctoral thesis, Kiel University Faculty of Law, 2007, pp. 163–5. Outside the UNEP
process is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Agreement on Transboundary Haze, Kuala
Lumpur (Malaysia), 10 June 2002, in force 25 Nov. 2003, available at: http://haze.asean.org/?
wpfb_dl=32.
181 See Item 11 of the Provisional Agenda for the 66th session of the ILC, 8 Jan. 2014, A/CN.4/665;
the preliminary outline and bibliography by S. Murase, ‘Protection of the Atmosphere: Syllabus’,
A/66/10/Add.1/Annex B (2011), pp. 315–29; S. Murase, ‘First Report on the Protection of the
Atmosphere’, A/CN.4/667.
182 A.A. Fraenkel, ‘The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge
of International Cooperation’ (1989) 30(2) Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 447–76, at 448.
183 Andorra, Israel, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and San Marino have not ratiﬁed (the Holy
See is an observer and has not ratiﬁed).
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There is a distinct North American approach to LRTAP because of the continent’s
geography, of which the CLRTAP is a component.184 The US and Canada have
selectively ratiﬁed the Protocols, preferring to ﬁnd bilateral solutions.185 The US has
also engaged in agreements with Mexico.186 In general, US domestic politics dictated
action on LRTAP in North America, although the regime may have contributed to
awareness raising.187 Bilateral agreements exist also in Europe, for example, between
Finland and Russia.188 Moreover, the development of EU environmental law has
created overlapping obligations for the Member States (see Section 2.1 above).
Participation in the regime therefore should be seen as nested within a framework of
international and European bilateral law and policy, driven by the national context.
Efforts to include the EIT/EECCA countries have achieved mixed results. The EU
has had some inﬂuence on participation levels with regard to the Protocols. Evidence
suggests that ratiﬁcation by Eastern European countries is often inﬂuenced by
impending EU membership.189 Turkey, a long-standing candidate country, has barely
engaged with the regime. In its view, ‘due regard’ should be given to its status as a
developing country, a position whereby it exempts itself from accepting international
standards.190 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine ceased to ratify the Protocols created after
1990, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the states of the Southern Caucasus have
only ratiﬁed the Convention. The end of Cold War diplomacy, which had secured
Soviet participation, partly explains these outcomes. They are also a legacy of the
USSR’s sole focus on controlling emissions near the European border. Furthermore,
LRTAP was of minor importance to the NIS, and the leading European states
were indifferent to LRTAP contained in the Eastern UNECE regions. Consequently,
the less developed states in the Eastern region did not receive adequate ﬁnancial
184 See A. Szekely, ‘Establishing a Region for Ecological Cooperation in North America’ (1992) 32
Natural Resources Journal, pp. 563–632.
185 The Memorandum of Intent concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Washington (US), 5 Aug.
1980, Canada–United States, (1981) 20 International Legal Materials 690; Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Air Quality, Ottawa
(Canada), 13 Mar. 1991, (1991) 30 International Legal Materials 678; Annex 3 – Ozone Annex
(December 2000) amending the ‘Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America on Air Quality’, available at: http://www.ijc.org/en_/Air_
Quality__Agreement. See J.L. Roelofs, ‘United States–Canada Air Quality Agreement: A Framework
for Addressing Transboundary Air Pollution Problems’ (1993) 26 Cornell International Law Journal,
pp. 421–54.
186 See D.M. Liverman et al., ‘Environmental Issues Along the United States-Mexico Border: Drivers of
Change and Responses of Citizens and Institutions (1999) 24 Annual Review of Energy and the
Environment, pp. 607–43.
187 L.R. Cass, ‘Air Pollution and Acid Rain’, in P.G. Harris (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global
Environmental Politics (Routledge, 2014), pp. 388–99, at 396.
188 See http://www.ym.ﬁ/en-US/International_cooperation/International_environmental_agreements; V. Kotov
& E. Kikitina, ‘Regime and Enterprise: Norilsk Nickel and Transboundary Air Pollution’, in Victor,
Raustiala & Skolnikoff, n. 56 above, pp. 549–74; G. Hønneland & A.-K. Jørgensen, Implementing
International Environmental Agreements in Russia (Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 145–62;
see also J. Sommer, ‘Transboundary Cooperation between Poland and its Neighbouring States’, in
Flinterman, Kwiatkowska & Lammers, n. 23 above, pp. 205–33.
189 See Selin & VanDeever, n. 49 above, at p. 81. Poland is an exception to this, having only ratiﬁed the
1988 NOX Protocol, n. 55 above.
190 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environmental Performance
Reviews: Turkey (OECD, 2008), at p. 207.
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assistance, technology transfer or joint implementation.191 Despite gaining around 15
new parties to the CLRTAP, a third of UNECE members have not engaged with the
Protocols; however, their decision not to participate has come at a price: a loss of
inﬂuence in the regime, particularly in the case of Russia.192 State participation is a
key area where the regime needs to make substantial improvements. This issue has
undermined environmental effectiveness, as these states are subject only to minimal
obligations to control, reduce and prevent LRTAP.
4.3. Assignment of Implementation Responsibilities and the Degree of Burden Sharing
The CLRTAP was intentionally liability-neutral and the extent to which responsi-
bility has been addressed is open to interpretation.193 A key point for investigation is
whether states with the highest capacity and inclination to comply carry the greatest
burden, as this arguably strengthens the regime’s effectiveness.194 Initially this was
not the case: the early Protocols allocated the same emissions reduction percentage to
all states. As the regime developed, the emergence of differentiated targets attempted
to reconcile economic considerations with environmental vulnerability and political
will. The development of ﬂexible emissions management areas for VOCs and sulphur
fostered participation by Canada and Norway, and enabled them to focus on LRTAP
with less stringent commitments for the rest of their territories. Although the
development of NECs enabled greater implementation responsibilities to be assigned
to Western European states, the commitments for the highly polluting EIT states do
not conform with the idea of burden sharing, as the latter lack both the capacity and
the inclination to comply.195
The 1991 VOCs Protocol196 and the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II197 introduced
differentiated targets. For example, those states with the greatest inclination and
capacity to reduce sulphur emissions, such as Germany and the Nordic states, took an
ambitious NEC equivalent to a reduction of around 80% of 1980 levels by 2000.
France and the UK obtained a ten-year extension to achieve a similar reduction.
Highly polluting EIT states also received additional time, but cost efﬁciency and
environmental criteria apparently overrode considerations of capacity and inclination.
191 Darst, n. 169 above, pp. 109–16; Levy, n. 4 above, at p. 65; See S. Stec, A. Antypas & T. Steger,
‘Transition and Governance: The Case of Post-Communist States’, in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel
Governance of Global Environmental Change (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 358–83.
192 A.E. Farrell and T.J. Keating, ‘Dissent and Trust in Multilateral Assessments: Comparing LRTAP and
OTAG’, in A.E. Farrell and J. Jäger (eds), Assessments of Regional and Global Environmental Risks
(RFF Press, 2006), pp. 64–83, at 79.
193 See the footnote inserted to Art. 8(f) CLRTAP. This has been described as a ‘disclaimer of State
responsibility’: F.C. Eisenstein, ‘Economic Implications of European Transfrontier Pollution: National
Prerogative and Attribution of Responsibility’ (1981) 11 Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law, pp. 519–61, at 555. See M. Pallemaerts, ‘International Legal Aspects of Long-
range Transboundary Air Pollution’ (1988) 1 Hague Yearbook of International Law, pp. 189–224.
194 Bodansky, n. 8 above, p. 264.
195 J. Gupta, ‘Effectiveness of Air Pollution Treaties: The Role of Knowledge, Power and Participation’,
in M. Hisschemöller et al. (eds), Policy Studies Review Annual Vol. 12: Knowledge, Power, and
Participation in Environmental Policy Analysis (Transaction, 2001), pp. 145–74, at 160.
196 N. 32 above.
197 N. 69 above.
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For example, Poland needed to reduce emissions by around 66% to reach its 2010
ceiling. RAINS modelling had demonstrated that large reductions in Poland would
achieve the greatest cost efﬁciency.198 However, in the early 1990s, the Polish
economy was relatively weak (as were most of the NIS), whilst the post-Communist
government faced signiﬁcant governance challenges199 and would have struggled to
invest more in order to reach its target without increased donor support. The fairness
of the targets was therefore questionable, and many highly polluting EIT countries
chose not to participate. Whether this justiﬁes Poland’s continued ambivalence to the
LRTAP regime in 2014, after ten years of EU membership, is a different matter.
Differentiated targets have become a feature of the regime, with mixed results in
terms of ratiﬁcation. The 1998 Heavy Metals Protocol200 allowed the EIT countries
ten instead of ﬁve years in which to achieve compliance with the product control
measures.201 The 2012 amendments of the Heavy Metals Protocol202 and the 1999
Gothenburg Protocol203 introduced further differentials to appeal speciﬁcally to new
parties to the Protocol. The Gothenburg Protocol affords new parties an extension for
the development of implementation plans with a ﬁnal implementation deadline
of 31 December 2030.204 The 2012 amendments to the Heavy Metals Protocol
contained similar extensions for the implementation of BAT and limit values
to existing stationary sources.205 Such differential targets may produce better
environmental outcomes in the long term if these measures are sufﬁciently attractive
to prospective parties.
Financial assistance
A cost-sharing mechanism or speciﬁc provisions on the transfer of technology to the
non-EU EECCA countries could offset the weaknesses of the regime’s regulatory
approach, increase ratiﬁcation and the implementation of the Protocols, and produce
better environmental outcomes.206 These have not been established, even though the
EB has explored the possibility of ﬁnancial mechanisms. There is a limit to the
regime’s ability to foster cooperation. Since the mid-1990s, the parties have been
invited to contribute to the Trust Fund so that the participation of one government
representative from each of the EIT states can be funded;207 this appears to have
198 C. Albin, ‘Rethinking Justice and Fairness: The Case of Acid Rain Emission Reductions’ (1995) 21(2)
Review of International Studies pp. 119–43, at 131. Belarus was similarly given a large emissions
reduction commitment of 50%.
199 See F. Millard, ‘Environmental Policy in Poland’ (1998) 7(1) Environmental Politics, pp. 145–61.
200 N. 177 above.
201 Ibid., Annex VI(5).
202 2012 Heavy Metals Protocol Amendments, n. 107 above.
203 2012 Gothenburg Protocol Amendments, n. 108 above.
204 Ibid., Art. 3 bis.
205 2012 Heavy Metals Protocol Amendments, n. 107 above, Art. 3 bis.
206 J. Sliggers & G. Klaassen, ‘Cost Sharing for the Abatement of Acidiﬁcation in Europe: The Missing
Link in the New Sulphur Protocol’ (1994) 4(1) European Environment, pp. 5–11; Albin, n. 198
above, at p. 135.
207 Decision 1997/4, Facilitation of Participation of Countries with Economies in Transition, ECE/EB.
AIR/53, Annex VII, p. 55; Decision 2001/6, ECE/EB.AIR/75, Annex X; Decision 2003/11, ECE/EB.
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increased their participation in the negotiations.208 The 2010 Long-term Strategy
reiterated the need for adequate funding to improve participation, and Decision
2012/26 called for a high-level meeting on actions to promote better air quality
within the countries of EECCA.209 The creation of the EECCA Coordinating Group
in 2011, which focuses on the Russian sphere of inﬂuence, is a signiﬁcant step
towards creating a dual process that may lead to greater participation. Belarus,
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova have signalled their intention to become parties to
the later Protocols,210 but Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are
unlikely to do so in the short term.211
Donor countries, EU-sponsored projects, and the UN Development Account
(UNDA) provide support for projects in the EECCA countries. These projects have
concentrated on the creation of emissions inventories, monitoring, and the ratiﬁcation
of the most recent Protocols.212 Although a useful ﬁrst step, programmes with greater
ambition are needed. The absence of burden sharing through a funding mechanism or
a formal system of joint implementation to aid the least developed states in the
UNECE area has reduced effectiveness.213
4.4. The Empowerment of Domestic Stakeholders
Prior to the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, the regime contained no speciﬁc provisions on
public access to information. This Protocol required states to ‘promote’ the provision of
information to the general public on issues such as national annual emissions,
compliance information, pollution levels, and the health and environmental effects of
the pollutants.214 While this was a signiﬁcant development, it is somewhat undermined
by its weak phraseology. The deﬁciency in provisions on public access to information
arises partly out of the East–West politics of the early period of the LRTAP regime and
the culture of industrial secrecy of the USSR. Moreover, environmental issues are
politically sensitive and states may wish to control the ﬂow of information. Nonetheless,
as a result of the activities of the regime and the current emphasis on transparency – as
embodied by the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters215
AIR/79/Add.1, Annex XI; Decision 2005/9, ECE/EB.AIR/87/Add.1, Annex IX; Decision 2006/13,
ECE/EB.AIR/89/Add.1. Members of the EU or OECD do not qualify.
208 Wettestad (2011), n. 4 above, at p. 51.
209 Decision 2010/18, n. 132 above; Decision 2012/26 ECE/EB.AIR/113/Add.1.
210 Moldova is a party to the POPs Protocol 1998, n. 175 above.
211 EECCA Coordinating Group, 1st Report, n. 59 above.
212 See UNECE, ‘Capacity Building Activities’, available at: http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/
treaties/air-pollution/capacity-building-activities.html. E.g., the project on ‘Capacity Building for Air
Quality Management and the Application of Clean Coal Combustion Technologies in Central Asia’
received $680,000 from the UN Development Account: see http://www.un.org/esa/devaccount/projects/
2004/0405C.html.
213 See Gupta, n. 195 above, at p. 162.
214 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, n. 47 above, Art. 5.
215 Aarhus (Denmark), 25 June 1998, in force 29 Oct. 2001, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/
treatytext.html.
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and its implementation in UNECE Member States including the EU – there is now a
large amount of reported emissions data publically available.
Intergovernmental organizations, NGOs216 and industrial groups may attend
meetings as observers, whilst NGOs must have consultative status with the UNECE
to attend working group meetings.217 The unofﬁcial Heads of Delegations meetings
that take place during the negotiations of the Protocols have been ‘exclusive’,218 and
NGOs do not appear to have participated as observers of the work of the IC.219
NGOs have a limited inﬂuence and no role in decision making. However, their
involvement in the ﬁnal negotiations might not produce better outcomes; it could
slow the negotiation process or reduce the opportunities for diplomacy.220 Domestic
successes for NGOs occurred mainly in the early years of the regime, and some NGOs
lobbied intensely for the ratiﬁcation of the legal agreements.221 The limited resources
of NGOs, combined with the emergence of other environmental problems (such as
climate change) and the increased role of the EU, saw NGOs switch their focus,
although they have maintained an interest.222 There is very little public participation
in the regime.223
The regime’s engagement with industry groups in respect of the BATEF standard
has produced some notable outcomes. Technical seminars brought together members
of the industrial, scientiﬁc and policy-making communities, and enabled innovative
technologies to be demonstrated as technically and economically feasible, thus aiding
their deployment.224 Industry groups have also been regular observers at LRTAP
meetings and seminars.
The regime was the major source of information on LRTAP in the 1980s, although
much of this information was inaccessible to the public. The internet may have
increased accessibility, particularly in highly developed European states where
internet usage is higher.225 However, awareness of the Convention and LRTAP
in general has declined across key stakeholder groups (the public, politicians and
216 E.g. the Air Pollution and Climate Secretariat: see http://www.airclim.org.
217 Wettestad (1999), n. 4 above, at p. 105.
218 Ibid.
219 Milano, n. 158 above, at p. 173.
220 L. Björkbom, ‘Negotiations over Transboundary Air Pollution: The Case of Europe’ (1999) 4(3)
International Negotiation, pp. 389–411, at 407.
221 E.g., the Environmental Law Institute in Washington, DC (US) contributed to the signature and
ratiﬁcation of the 1988 NOX Protocol by the US government: see R.N. Mott, ‘An Environmental
Accord the US Should Support’, Chicago Tribune, 12 July 1988, available at: http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/1988-07-12/news/8801140554_1_global-warming-acid-rain-emissions. See also C. Ågren,
‘The UNECE Convention: Implications for the NGOs’, in the report of the 1989 NGO Strategy Seminar
on Air Pollution, H. Smit (ed.), Nature Demands Stricter Limits (Stichting Natuur en Milieu, 1989),
pp. 23–7.
222 Ågren, n. 48 above, at p. 135.
223 Debate over exactly what public participation is or should be is unresolved. See J. Forrester et al.,
‘Governance of Air Quality and Stakeholder Engagement: Lessons and Experience from International
Cases’, in Lidskog & Sundqvist (eds), n. 4 above, pp. 293–320.
224 Sand, n. 61 above, at p. 256. Not all states were laggards in this sense; for the supporting role of the
US government see Taylor et al., ‘Effect of Government Actions on Technological Innovation for SO2
Control’ (2003) 37(20) Environmental Science & Technology, pp. 4527–34.
225 Nordberg et al., n. 123 above, at p. 106.
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local NGOs, for example).226 As Ågren has noted, the regime needs to improve
communication to increase domestic knowledge and awareness of air pollution, while
simultaneously raising its proﬁle. Solutions for this problem, such as an effective
communications strategy and a travel fund to aid the participation of NGOs,
will require additional funding.227 The 2010 Long-term Strategy and 2011 Action
Plan has included the need for an improved communications strategy.228 With the
implementation of higher pollution reduction requirements in the next decade,
success will depend more on public opinion and support.229 It will be interesting to
see whether the regime can avoid controversy, particularly in the context of European
budget austerity.
Evaluating the empowerment of stakeholders is extremely difﬁcult as much is out
of the control of the LRTAP regime. However, beyond the provision of information,
effective empowerment in the domestic process remains problematic.
5. conclusion
The combined approaches to effectiveness taken by Sand and Bodansky constitute a
useful basis for the exploration of the LRTAP regime. This study has shown that
compliance, institutional, and normative effectiveness can be measured reasonably
well. In general, the LRTAP regime conforms to Bodansky’s notion of ‘trade-offs’ and
‘art and craft’.
The regime faces signiﬁcant challenges concerning participation, implementation
procedures, empowerment of domestic stakeholders, and funding. The most recent
EMEP Status Reports indicate that,230 although there is much to be optimistic about
regarding the remarkable reductions in acidiﬁcation, lead pollution, and certain
POPs, signiﬁcant progress still needs to made on eutrophication, ground level ozone,
photochemical smog, PM, and heavy metals and POPs more generally.
With the increased role of the EU and the somewhat autonomous North American
framework, it is difﬁcult to ascribe an overall level of effectiveness to the regime as
there is a signiﬁcant degree of overlap. Nonetheless, the regime has shown that states
can agree on contentious issues and achieve results. As a model regional MEA, the
regime’s replication in other regions may be problematic, especially for developing
countries. States must have the necessary ﬁnancial and administrative capacities to
comply with this type of regime. The Convention’s basic method of creating sound
institutions, and its engagement with science, has nevertheless provided a model for
subsequent international treaties.
226 Ågren, n. 48 above, at p. 137.
227 Ibid., at pp. 138 and 141.
228 N. 132 above.
229 Ågren, n. 48 above, at p. 141.
230 See http://emep.int/publ/common_publications.html.
28 Transnational Environmental Law
APPENDIX
Table 1: Compliance with the Protocols’ Major Objectives
Protocol No. of Parties Major Objectives Compliance Status
Protocol on Long-term Financing of the Cooperative
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-
range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (1984 EMEP
Protocol).1
46 Set mandatory and voluntary contributions,2 determined in
terms of percentages (budget reviewed and approved by
Executive Body on a continuing basis).
Good levels of compliance. Notable case of arrears: Ukraine
1996–2001 (in kind contributions, $175,205 outstanding in
2013).3
Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their
Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent (1985 Sulphur
Protocol I).4
25 30% reduction in sulphur emissions by 1993, using 1980 as
the base year.
High levels of compliance: by 1993, the overall reduction was
~50%; 11 parties reduced by at least 60%.5
Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes (1988 NOX
Protocol).6
35 Stabilize emissions or transboundary ﬂuxes of NOX so they
do not exceed 1987 levels by 1994. Unleaded fuel to be made
available to allow the use of catalytic converters.7
Moderate to high levels of compliance: the overall reduction
was 9%.8 Cases of non-compliance:9 Ireland (1995–2003);10
Spain (1997–2011);11 Greece (1998–2013);12 and Cyprus
(2008–present).13
Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile
Organic Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes (1991
VOCs Protocol).14
24 20 parties to reduce non-methane VOC emissions by 30% on
the base-year (a choice from 1984 to 1990) by 1999. Canada
and Norway to reduce by 30% in their Tropospheric Ozone
Management Areas and, along with Bulgaria and Hungary,
to limit national emissions to 1988 levels.
Moderate levels of compliance: 7 parties compliant by the
deadline; 4 states reduced emissions by 16–21%;15 by 2006,
the EU had reduced by 41%.16 Cases of non-compliance:
Italy (1999–2002);17 Norway (1999-2006);18 and Spain
(1999–2013).19
Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (1994
Sulphur Protocol II).20
29 Parties to ensure, as far as possible, that critical loads are not
exceeded in the long-term. Parties had differentiated targets
for 2000, 2005 and 2010. The Canadian target applied only
in the sulphur oxides management area, South-East Canada.
All parties met their targets.21
Protocol on Heavy Metals (1998 Heavy Metals Protocol).22 33 Cadmium, lead, and mercury emissions to be controlled and
reduced to the reference year (1990, or between 1985 and
1995). Emission limit values and best available techniques
(BAT) to be applied, within set time-scales, to new and
existing major stationary sources. Leaded petrol to be
phased out.
Final deadline was end of 2011. Cyprus found in non-
compliance with cadmium obligations.23 From national
reported data (1990–2011), lead emissions reduced by 90%,
cadmium and mercury emissions by ~60%. Deposition of
lead reduced by 75%, cadmium by 51%, and mercury by
37%.24 The difference between mercury emissions and
deposition is as a result of intercontinental transport and
natural sources.
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Protocol No. of Parties Major Objectives Compliance Status
Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (1998 POPs
Protocol).25
33 Parties to control, reduce or eliminate the speciﬁed POPs;
8 were banned (e.g. toxaphene), 4 scheduled for elimination,
4 had severe restrictions placed on them (including DDT and
PCBs). Parties were required to reduce dioxins, furans,
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and
hexachlorobenzene (HCB) emissions to 1990 levels, or an
alternative year between 1985 and 1995. Deadline created
for the introduction of emission limit values for incineration.
Set rules for the disposal of the banned substances.
The objectives were partially achieved: in the EMEP region
(1990–2012), polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-153 air
concentrations decreased by 80%; PAH pollution levels
decreased by 30%; dioxin and furan pollution levels
decreased by 50%; and HCB pollution levels decreased by
almost 90%.26
Cases of non-compliance: Denmark (PAHs, 2006–present);27
Germany (PAHs, 2010–12); Italy (PAHs, 2010–present);
Estonia (dioxins/furans, PAHs, HCB, 2010–present); Latvia
(dioxins/furans, PAHs, HCB, 2010–present);28 and Moldova
(missing emissions data for dioxins/furans and PAH
emissions, 2011–present).29
Protocol to Abate Acidiﬁcation, Eutrophication and Ground-
level Ozone (1999 Gothenburg Protocol).30
26 Parties to control and reduce emissions of sulphur, NOX,
VOCs and ammonia. The 2010 emission ceilings/targets are
based on critical loads. The differentiated reduction targets
used 1990 as the base year. Created comprehensive emission
limit values for a range of sources; obligation to use BAT.
Particulate matter (PM), carbon monoxide (CO), and
methane (CH4) were included in the limit values for fuels and
new mobile sources.
The EB has not yet dealt with compliance with this Protocol.
The reductions estimated by EMEP from reported data
(1990–2011) was 42% for NOX. Parties exceeding the 2010
target: Denmark (by 20%); Belgium (16%); France (17%);
Spain (8%); and Luxembourg (100%).31 Non-methane VOC
emissions decreased by 53%. Target not reached by Germany
and Luxembourg (by ~1%). SOX emissions decreased by
~70% and all parties achieved their target in 2010–11.
Ammonia (NH3) emissions decreased by 31%. Six parties
exceeded their targets in 2011: Denmark (7%); Croatia
(23%); Germany (2%); Finland (20%); Norway (14%); and
Spain (8%). CO emissions in the EMEP area decreased by
57%.32
Notes:
1 Geneva (Switzerland), 28 Sept. 1984, in force 28 Jan. 1988, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/emep_h1.html.
2 The EMEP area includes Europe, Turkey and the Southern Caucasus, and the Central Asian states: see http://www.ceip.at/ms/ceip_home1/ceip_home/new_emep-grid.
3 Chapter XI, para. 73(f), Report of the Executive Body on its 32ndsession, Geneva (Switzerland), 9–13 Dec. 2013, ECE/EB.AIR/122, available at: http://www.unece.org/index.php?id = 33605#.
4 Helsinki (Finland), 8 July 1985, in force 2 Sept. 1987, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/sulf_h1.html.
5 Ibid.
6 Soﬁa (Bulgaria), 31 Oct. 1988, in force 14 Feb. 1991, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/nitr_h1.html.
7 Catalytic converters convert NOX into CO2, nitrogen, and water.
8 See http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/nitr_h1.html.
9 Note all Executive Body Decisions referenced in this table are available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/executivebody/eb_decision.html.
10 Decision 2005/5 (ref. 3/02), ECE/EB.AIR/87/Add.1, p. 8, Annex V.
11 Decision 2011/3 (ref. 4/02), ECE/EB.AIR/109/Add.1.
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12 Decision 2013/6 (ref. 2/02), ECE/EB.AIR/122/Add.1.
13 Decision 2013/5 (ref. 1/08 and ref. 1/10 (Cd)), ECE/EB.AIR/122/Add.1 (Cyprus acceded to the Protocol in Sept. 2004).
14 Geneva (Switzerland), 18 Nov. 1991, in force 29 Sept. 1997, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/vola_h1.html.
15 H. Selin & S.D. VanDeveer, ‘Mapping Institutional Linkages in European Air Pollution Politics’ (2003) 3(3) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 14–46, at 25.
16 See http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/30anniversary.html.
17 Decision 2005/3 (ref. 3/01), ECE/EB.AIR/87/Add.1, p. 5, Annex III.
18 Decision 2008/2 (ref. 1/01), ECE/EB.AIR/96/Add.1.
19 Decision 2013/7 (ref. 6/02), ECE/EB.AIR/122/Add.1.
20 Oslo (Norway), 14 June 1994, in force 5 Aug. 1998, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/fsulf_h1.html.
21 UNECE, ‘Strategies and Policies for Air Pollution Abatement: 2006 Review’, ECE/EB.AIR/93 (UN, 2007), at p. 29.
22 Aarhus (Denmark), 24 June 1998, in force 29 Dec. 2003, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/hm_h1.html.
23 Decision 2013/5, n. 13 above.
24 I. Ilyin et al., Heavy Metals: Transboundary Pollution of the Environment, EMEP Status Report 2/2013 (Meteorological Synthesizing Centre–East (MSC-E)/Chemical Co-ordinating Centre (CCC), 2013), pp. 5–6.
25 Aarhus (Denmark), 24 June 1998, in force 23 Oct. 2003, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/pops_h1.html.
26 A. Gusev et al., Persistent Organic Pollutants in the Environment, EMEP Status Report 3/2014 (MSC-E/CCC, 2014), at p. 4.
27 Decision 2013/8 (ref. 1/06 (PAH)), ECE/EB.AIR/122/Add.1.
28 Decision 2012/17 (refs. 2/10, 5/10, 10/10, 3/10 and 11/10), ECE/EB.AIR/113/Add.1.
29 Decision 2013/11 (ref. 14/10 (PAH; dioxin/furan)), ECE/EB.AIR/122/Add.1. Iceland had been held to be non-compliant with its obligations concerning PAHs, but Decision 2013/9 (ref. 6/10 (PAH)), ECE/EB.AIR/122/Add.1
found that Iceland qualiﬁed for a conditional exemption under Art. 3(7), having followed the process set out in Art. 3(5)(b) (i.e. applied the speciﬁed best available techniques, limit values, and effective control measures to the
appropriate sources).
30 Gothenburg (Sweden), 30 Nov. 1999, in force 15 May 2005, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/multi_h1.html.
31 The signatories who exceeded their reduction target included Liechtenstein (76%), Austria (71%), Ireland (9%).
32 M. Gauss et al., ‘Status of Transboundary Pollution in 2011’, in M. Schulz et al. (eds), Transboundary Acidiﬁcation, Eutrophication and Ground Level Ozone in Europe in 2011, EMEP Status Report 1/2013 (Norwegian
Meteorological Institute, 2013), pp. 17–42, at 24–6. National PM data may have signiﬁcant uncertainty associated with it.
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